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Abstract
We leverage a transaction costs narrative to provide a theoretically unified presentation of the evolution of
exchange, with the latest evolutionary frontier being cryptocurrency and decentralized finance. We show
that with each new development in the evolution of money, the new form or medium of exchange must
reduce transaction costs relative to relevant alternatives. The development of blockchain and
cryptocurrency reduced the cost of transferring currency by removing the need for a trusted third party to
intermediate funds while also providing the benefit of anonymity/pseudonymity. Likewise, decentralized
finance does not require a third party to intermediate savings and investment and can provide contingent
anonymity to borrowers. While these innovations have attracted investment in the economically
developed world, they appear to have significantly reduced transaction costs for transactors who might
otherwise be defrauded of funds by corrupt governments who may extort third parties responsible for
intermediating funds.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Text In the canonical presentation of money and its emergence, the adoption of
media of exchange across a network of exchange is supposed to reduce transaction
costs: search costs, storage costs, transportation costs, and costs owing to a lack of
divisibility of the goods being exchanged (Menger 1871; 1885; 1892; Kiyotaki and
Wright 1992). So long as adoption of a commodity as a commonly accepted medium
of exchange is expected to succeed in reducing transaction costs sufficiently to allow
economic actors to attain the resources required for economic activity or survival, a
commonly accepted medium of exchange will tend to be adopted.
While ahistorical in its literal sense, Menger’s causal-genetic narrative of the
evolution of money is a valuable starting point for two reasons: (1) It recognizes the
significance of piecemeal changes guided by the discovery of profits. And (2) these
profits are made possible by falling transaction costs. Growing profits incentivize
actors to continue the behavior that generated the profit and incentivize
entrepreneurs to copy and develop the behavior of those who are earning relatively
higher profits (Bikchandi, et al, 1998).
The latest frontier in monetary evolution includes growing adoption of
cryptocurrency for exchange and, increasingly, for financing. Uniquely to
cryptocurrencies, both direct payments and financial intermediation occur without
requiring a trusted third party to intermediate exchange. For a mature system of
cryptocurrency and cryptofinance, the removal or repositioning of third parties that
facilitate exchange and financial intermediation potentiates a significant reduction
of transaction costs.
In what follows, we leverage the transaction costs narrative to unify an account
of the evolution of monetary exchange and, subsequently, to analyze the past
development of money and consider current and future development of
cryptocurrency and decentralized finance. In doing so, we contribute to two
literatures. First, our framework resolves tension with regard to the debate between
followers of the Mengerian story of monetary evolution and those who conceive of
money arising through local custom such as gift exchange. The result is a narrative
that is more robust, capable of integrating Mengerian insights with a more nuanced
historical development. Second, and the focus of this article, the framework
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integrates our understanding of the evolution of cryptocurrency within the broader
context of monetary evolution as illuminated by transaction cost economics.
2. TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE
The fundamental problem of exchange is that, in the absence of exchange
institutions, gains from trade are dissipated by a variety of transaction costs. These
transaction costs include, most significantly, the costs of preventing opportunistic
behavior – whether through ex post punishment or ex ante preventative measures –
i.e. enforcement costs. But they can also include negotiation costs, search costs, and
transportation costs. Exchange institutions stereotype certain aspects of exchange in
order to reduce these transaction costs. For example, institutions might exist to
routinize punishment of opportunism, or fairness norms might circumscribe
haggling and negotiation.
Harwick (2018) introduces a taxonomy of exchange institutions based on fixed
and marginal costs of exchange. The marginal costs of exchange are the transaction
costs incurred in each trade. The fixed costs, on the other hand, are up-front costs
incurred by a whole community in order to reduce the marginal transaction costs of
trade. For example, an institution for enforcing agreements is costly to maintain, but
it greatly reduces the potential losses incurred in each individual trade, especially
high-value trades, and thus – hopefully – amortizes its own cost by generating more
gains from trade. All exchange institutions, including money in all its varieties,
involve incurring some fixed cost in order to reduce marginal transaction costs.
Transaction costs, of course, are a function of scale. Holding exchange institutions
constant, search, enforcement, and transportation costs all rise with the number of
potential trading partners. Small-scale traditional societies, with a correspondingly
small volume of trade, can approximate the game theoretic setting of no transaction
costs and infinite play, simply because small scale and a high level of familiarity keep
transaction costs at a feasible level, even as trade becomes prohibitively costly
outside the boundaries of the community. For example, the lack of effective exchange
institutions limited trade and production in early medieval Europe to the manor,
which was a village or, at best, a small collection of villages overseen by a lord “who
was expected to defend the village and to administer the customary law” (North and
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Thomas 1973). Without a wider overarching institution to enforce agreements,
vulnerability to opportunism associated with finite games prevents exchange and,
more broadly, peaceful interaction with those outside the community (that is,
between anonymous parties). There might be significant trade between villages
within a manor headed by a single local sovereign, but prior to the commercial and
urban revivals of the 11th century, with weak states and enforcement mechanisms,
trade between manors and certainly between kingdoms was limited owing to low
trust and familiarity between citizens of distinct principalities.
Since Hicks (1935), it has been well-accepted in economics that money is an
exchange institution that serves to reduce transaction costs (Alchian 1977, Allen
1999) when the trading network is too large for personal relationships to ensure
repeated dealings. The evolutionary trajectory of money is tied to these marginal
transaction costs that it reduces (Selgin and White 1987; Baird 2000; Stenkula 2003)
and also tied to the fixed costs of the institutions necessary to reduce them (Hodgson
1992).
Table 1 Equilibrium exchange strategies without a money commodity

Transaction Costs

No Transaction Costs

Finite Play

Always Defect

Always Cooperate

Infinite
Play

Probability of Defection Increases
with Rising Transaction Costs

Always Cooperate

Enforcement costs are particularly significant at larger scales, where actors are
essentially strangers to one another and lack the normative leverage of repeated
dealings. Absent any overarching institutions with the power to make binding
obligations from both actors, the actors essentially interact in anarchy and are at risk
of falling to violence or cunning from other parties (Buchanan 1975; Caton 2020).
To minimize these costs, exchange will more likely occur between parties that are
familiar within one another, in contexts with normative leverage, for example,
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extended kin networks (North 1990), even within a larger society. This moves
interaction from a finitely repeated game of an institutionless context to an infinitely
repeated game subject to the norms of kin and institutions made accessible by the
kinship network at relative low cost.
The four kinds of transaction costs identified with the emergence of money –
costs from search, storage, transportation, and divisibility – begin to impinge upon
gains from trade when not wholly contained within a given community. With the
invention of money, the traditional Mengerian narrative become increasingly
relevant (Zelmanovitz 2016). Outside of a network of personalistic obligations,
actors face increasing uncertainty concerning with whom they can profitably trade.
Development of a money commodity plays an important role in reducing this
uncertainty as it increases the likelihood of finding a stranger who will be willing to
trade. While money does not solve all problems associated with trade outside of the
manor, it is an integral part of the solution to the dilemmas arising from trade that
stretches beyond a particular community and, ultimately, that enables specialization
and innovation.
With the transaction costs of in-kind exchange rising rapidly with scale,
producers are incentivized to incur the fixed costs that lead to monetary exchange.
As Menger identifies, those engaged in commercial activity will seek to acquire a
marketable commodity for exchange. Attributes that promote a commodity’s
salability include storability, divisibility, portability, and scarcity. Historically,
precious metals were adopted as commodities that efficiently facilitated exchange
where barter relations proved too costly.
3. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Compared to more primitive exchange institutions, monetary exchange coordinates
resource use within a sufficiently large community so that, from the perspective of
any individual member (though not from the perspective of the community as a
whole), consumption may be delayed as long as desired following the receipt of
income. Without the relatively secure property institutions undergirding a money
economy, the risk of loss or decay of income-in-kind motivates consumption
following very shortly after production and income. And in a small community, this
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must also be true for the community as a whole. But with a sufficiently large
community and monetary institutions, any member’s decision to delay consumption
can be coordinated more or less effortlessly with another member’s decision to
redeem previously delayed consumption. In this sense, to hold income as money can
be understood as an in-kind loan to the community.
What, then, is the function of borrowing and lending money if money itself can be
understood as a method of coordinating borrowing and lending in kind
(Kocherlakota 1998)? One important limitation of money – and the key to its
incentive-compatibility – is the fact that, for any individual member, it only allows
consumption to postdate income, not to predate it. Finance, on the other hand, allows
– again, from the perspective of an individual and not the community as a whole –
consumption to precede income (Harwick and Caton 2020). This ability to move
receipt of income forward or backward in time using the same monetary medium as
used for spot exchange is a hallmark of the modern capitalist economy. Owners of
idle capital can efficiently dedicate their resources to productive entrepreneurial
ventures.
To begin, we may consider the cost of risk to the lender. For example, imagine
that at the current equilibrium rate, 1 out of 10 borrowers defaults in full on a loan
with no means of repayment. For the lender, this amounts to a loss of 10% of
invested funds. Suppose that the investor will only invest if he can earn a net rate of
return 𝑟. In a world with a positive rate of default, a risk premium, 𝛿, is added to the
rate of interest, 𝑟, to make equal the expected return with the return that would be
earned in a risk-free world. This return would be equal to the interest rate if 100%
of borrowers repaid their debt:
. 9(1 + 𝑟 + 𝛿) = 1 + 𝑟
. 9 + .9𝑟 + .9𝛿 = 1 + 𝑟
. 9𝛿 = .1(1 + 𝑟)
𝛿=
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In a world where the risk of default is 10%, in order to incur no accounting loss,
the lender must charge a risk premium, 𝛿, of 12.2% that is added to the interest rate
of 10%. We may generalize by representing the risk of default as 𝜆:1
𝛿=

𝜆
(1 + 𝑟)
(1 – 𝜆)

We present combinations of 𝑟, 𝜆, and 𝛿 implied by this equation in Figure 1.

1

(1 – 𝜆)(1 + 𝑟 + 𝛿) = (1 + 𝑟)

(1 + 𝑟 + 𝛿) =

(1 + 𝑟)
(1 – 𝜆)

𝛿=

(1 + 𝑟) − (1 – 𝜆)(1 + 𝑟)
(1 – 𝜆)

𝛿=

(1 + 𝑟) − (1 – 𝜆 + 𝑟 − 𝑟𝜆)
(1 – 𝜆)

𝛿=

( 𝜆 + 𝑟𝜆)
(1 – 𝜆)
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Figure 1

The color on the r-λ plane matches the δ value for a given coordinate pair r-λ; contour lines on the
same plane identify coordinates of a give δ value; lines projected on the r-δ plane reflect the δ value
of slices parallel to that plane at given intersection of the λ-axis; the shaded region that parallels in
the δ-λ plane represent the height of the slice of the 3-dimensional surface that parallels the r-axis.

Intertemporal exchange outside a network of personal obligations raises
questions of enforcement and expectations. If the lending game is played among
strategic actors with little or no recourse for exploitative behavior, the risk of
borrower opportunism cannot be recouped through higher interest rates due to the
adverse selection problem in which higher interest rates drive out good borrowers,
leaving only opportunists. Whereas in our baseline example, the problem could be
offset by an increase in the rate charged to the borrower, the rate of default increases
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as the rate charged to borrowers increases. Without institutional support, financial
networks must remain limited in scope.
Thus, finance relies on a backdrop of enforcement institutions that effectively
enforce promises – a function that seems quite natural today for states, but which
even relatively strong states prior to the 18th century did not perform. As Geis
(1968, p. 10) notes, “it was only in 1757 that a statutory provision for the
punishment of ‘mere private cheating’ was placed into English law,” and the duty of
the state to prosecute private fraud was a slow development elsewhere over the
coming centuries. This problem relegated investment to high trust environments of
repeated dealing – kin networks – and state borrowing, the latter often occurring
under duress.
The institutions necessary to support time-separated monetary exchange are
perhaps complementary to those necessary to support monetary spot exchange –
the same enforcement apparatus used to enforce property claims can also be used
to enforce private promises – but they are by no means identical. In addition to the
property enforcement necessary to support a usable medium of exchange, financial
development also requires efficient private or public means of collecting relevant
information about a borrower and for enforcing the terms of a loan. Without a means
of mitigating the risk of opportunism, no lending market can form (Phelan 1995;
Sanches 2011; Harwick and Caton 2020). As with barter exchange, financial markets
can only succeed where the lender expects that the borrower will not abscond with
funds. Institutions to this end may take the form of reputation management and
advertisement, collateral or hostage-taking (Williamson 1983). Effective institutions
facilitate the gathering of information to filter borrowers ex ante and punishment
opportunistic borrowers ex post. All of these, it should be noted, go well beyond the
mere property protection necessary for monetary exchange, although they may or
may not use the same administrative apparatus.
Institutions supporting the state’s own credibility as a borrower – and thus as a
market-maker – have historically been crucial for financial development. Hodgson
(2016) observes that financial development in England following the Glorious
Revolution immediately benefited the state and only over several decades did this
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benefit expand to private borrowers.2 Financiers have historically had tenuous
relationships with states. Although states do not suffer from the problem of a lack of
identifying information, pre-modern states do suffer from an ability to credibly
commit to repayment. King James I and King Charles I both struggled raise funds.
Despite the fact that they were able to force loans from investors, they still paid a
rate of interest in the range of 8% to 10% for these loans and paid higher rates in
other cases (North and Weingast 1989). Growing autonomy of English parliament
after the Restoration in 1660 increased confidence of lenders in the state’s
willingness and ability to repay its debts, especially after the Glorious Revolution in
1688. The rate paid on debt after the Glorious Revolution would fall to as low as 3%.
Transaction costs that had limited financial activity were greatly reduced both by the
credibility of the English state and the expanded scale of the market that it made
possible, and English finance, both public and private, experienced unprecedented
growth over the next century (North and Weingast 1989).
These examples are hardly a straightforward recipe for economic and
financial development, but they do suggest that the reduction of transaction costs is
a key prerequisite. In turn, these financial markets reduce transaction costs involved
in coordinating the transfer of real resources from savers to entrepreneurs, an
important ingredient in economic growth.
Finally, the wave of financial innovation in the latter half of the twentieth
century was also driven by the reduction of transaction costs (Miller 1986). In many
cases, these costs were the result of regulations and taxes that increased the
marginal cost of investment. In particular, Regulation Q prevented payment of
interest on checking accounts and capped interest payments on savings deposit
accounts. The initial interruption to the market following its implementation in
1933 was limited. At the time, nominal rate remained in the range of single digits.
2

Part of the reason for this was that wealth derived from land, the most significant source of

collateral, was often constrained by “entails [that] enforced primogeniture, ensuring that a landed
estate passed from one generation to another through the eldest son (2016, 86).” Although these
were restricted by court order in 1614, “these were replaced by voluntary and widespread ‘strict
settlements’ that had similar effects” (2016, 86).
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But as inflation began rising in the 1960s and 1970s, investors began seeking higher
returns to help offset this inflation, spurring financial innovation as an unintended
byproduct. The euro-dollar market emerged as a means of providing high interestbearing savings accounts. These accounts provided services similar to standard
deposit accounts. Their structure, however, was different. A multinational financial
firm could lend funds internally, allowing deposited dollars to support and benefit
from lending in European countries lacking a similar regulation (Friedman 1969;
Rugman 1981; Glasner 1989; Willmarth 2018). Legally, Regulation Q could not be
applied to these accounts. By avoiding the regulation, saved funds could flow to
higher yielding investments while maintaining a high level of liquidity for the
account holder. Higher liquidity entails lower transaction costs of converting the
investment to cash for a given rate of return. As in the English example, lower-cost
intermediation ultimately translates to a higher level of resources invested in
productive activity.
4. CRYPTOCURRENCY AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
The transaction costs approach to the evolution of money helps to frame our
understanding of impediments to the development of cryptocurrency and
decentralized finance, as well as the potential impact of these technologies on
economic organization. The development of digital money and decentralized finance
follows along the same lines as our sketch of the evolution of money and credit.
Blockchain technology can serve to greatly reduce the cost of transferring funds
electronically and the cost of lending funds. The cost of performing large transfers
of currency is significantly reduced compared to traditional transfers since the
validation of a large transaction is no more costly than the validation of a small
transaction, and no third-party enforcement is necessary. For much of 2021, fees for
Bitcoin transactions have been in the range of $2 to $3. While this is prohibitive for
many small transactions, two points bear mentioning: 1) this cost does not rise with
transaction size, making large transactions very economical, and 2) even for small
transactions, the Lightning network facilitates off-chain transactions at far lower
cost, “batching” and then registering them as a single transaction on the canonical
Bitcoin blockchain (Poon and Dryja 2016). In some protocols – most notably
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Bitcoin’s – low transaction costs are also facilitated by the issue of new currency to
network validators, who play a role in preventing the writing of fraudulent records
onto the blockchain. In Bitcoin’s case, with a declining rate of expansion over time,
this has provided a means to reduce user costs in the early stages of adoption. The
Ripple network, on the other hand, has attracted users by facilitating transactions
for only a fraction of a cent without support from a second layer through regular
offerings of XRP, in addition to the charging minimal fees for transfer of other assets
recognized on the Ripple ledger. 3 However, its blockchain does not provide as high
a degree of financial privacy as provided by Bitcoin or ZCash, the latter of which
intentionally obfuscates addresses linked to pseudonyms of transactors.
Public blockchains may also offer the additional feature of anonymity or
pseudonymity, where transaction records are public but not necessarily linked to a
persistent real-world identity. Other cryptocurrencies like Zcash are truly
anonymous and prevent the history of a given unit of cryptocurrency from being
monitored. While officials such as U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen are concerned
that this feature attracts those engaged in nefarious activities, this feature also adds
value for users living under governments where wealth is subject to confiscation,
theft, or other encumbrances that might lock them out of the financial sector.
Whether an actor’s motives are nefarious or noble, existing and potential
impediments to transactions are being reduced on net.4 It is this reduction in
transaction costs that allow struggling economies to grow and growing economies
to flourish.
Second, blockchain protocols that facilitate financial intermediation can reduce
transaction costs with regard to borrowing and lending. And, as with payments,
these systems can enable a modest degree of privacy. We have shown, and will
review here, how decentralized finance can be made incentive compatible (Harwick
and Caton 2020). And further, we will show that with the appropriate protocol, along

3

See

Bitcoin

and

Ripple

average

transaction

fee

historical

chart,

available

at:

https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/transactionfees-btc-xrp.html#3y.
4

It is possible that transaction costs are increased on some margins, but in order for a technology to

be widely adopted, it must lower costs on net.
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with access by that protocol to information from the traditional financial sector,
blockchain technology can facilitate lending without granting access of otherwise
private information to a human third party.
5. DIGITAL MONEY
While transferring money between users seems like an obvious application of
networked computing technology, the possibility of manipulating accounts
contained in a digital ledger posed an obstacle for many years following the
widespread adoption of the internet. The problem is not so simple as debiting one
agent’s account and crediting another. The reader could accomplish this end in an
excel spreadsheet or develop a program that systematically implements transaction.
Two problems obstructed the development of digital money: 1) anyone other than
the owner of an account must be prevented from transferring funds from that
account or granting another other user the right to transfer some defined amount of
funds, and 2) anyone with access to an account must be prevented from double
promising funds from that account. For decades these problems were thought to
necessitate a trusted third party to administer the ledger, and indeed such trusted
ledger-operators arose early in the history of the internet. But it was not until 2009,
with the advent of Bitcoin, that a fully decentralized and automatic solution was
developed and implemented.
The first problem can be solved using cryptographic methods that are also used
to support blockchain protocols. Using irreversible transformations (known as
‘hashing’) of inputs such as passwords, it can be shown to be computationally
infeasible to recover a password even if the hash is public, thus making secure access
to accounts possible. The second problem, however, is more difficult to implement
without a trusted central party, particularly if users want to maintain anonymity. It
generalizes to what is known as the Byzantine Generals problem, so-called because
of the difficulty of prioritizing signals coming from multiple sources. Before the
development of blockchain technology, financial firms solved this problem the same
way they solved the other: a trusted third-party ledger operator, whose priority over
other signals is “baked in” to institutional protocol. The user provides information
that allows an intermediary like PayPal to access and transfer funds to another user.
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Since double promising funds would expose PayPal to both loss of consumer trust
and legal liability, it is not incentivized to abuse its control over the ledger. If a user
wanted to transfer funds directly without any 3rd party intermediary, he or she was
required to trust the payee with information enabling access to funds held by a
financial institution.
One intermediate system for dealing with double spending was the development
of serial numbers attached to specific units of digital currency. Transaction of a
currency unit that has attached to it a serial number can be tracked, thus enabling
monitoring that could prevent double spending (Narayanan, et al., 2016;
Antonopoulos 2017). To be useful, this requires that the identity of a double spender
be linked to expenditure records, leaving no possibility of for anonymity.
Blockchain technology, by contrast, enables money transactions to include
anonymity while requiring no third party to oversee the transaction. In a sense, the
blockchain is the third party. A blockchain provides a public record of transaction
that can only be modified if a minimum level of consensus is reached among miners
or a class of nodes with voting rights. Here we will concentrate on the reduction of
the cost of money transfer as well as costs associated with revealing one’s identity
in the course of a financial transaction.5
The expectation that blockchain will succeed in generating value – likely a
consequence of its ability to reduce transaction costs – has attracted tremendous
attention from investors. As of July 14, 2021, total capitalization of cryptocurrency
markets stood at $1.35 Trillion.6 To put this in perspective, U.S. GDP was just under
$21 trillion in 2020. With good reason, a tremendous amount of resources has been
invested in blockchain and cryptocurrencies. Even without anonymity, blockchain
can greatly reduce the costs of money transfers by eliminating the need for third
party oversight of financial transactions.
The structure of blockchain transactions differs from traditional payments in
that the major transaction cost of crypto payments – namely, transaction fees – are

5

For an overview of the technical aspects of blockchain architecture from an economic perspective,

see Harwick (2022).
6

See current Coin Market Cap for an updated figure, available at: https://coinmarketcap.com/.

Published by Journal of New Finance - UFM Madrid, 2021

13

Journal of New Finance, Vol. 2 [2021], No. 4, Art. 3

constant rather than being proportional to the amount of value transferred. Thus,
while the Bitcoin blockchain on its own does not provide an efficient means of
making small transfers, large transfers can be made at significantly lower
proportional cost than in traditional financial systems. Transaction cost reductions
also occur in the form of time. Whereas traditional ACH money transfers can be
measured in hours and days, cryptocurrency transactions take only as long as is
required to approve a new block. On average the bitcoin blockchain adds a new block
every 10 minutes. Lakkakula, Bullock, and Wilson (2020) find that use of blockchain
to track shipments and procure the transfer of funds reduced time costs by 41% (See
also Potts 2019; Schmidt and Wagner 2019). Further, as we will see, the ability of
blockchain to reduce transaction costs is not limited to only direct exchange of
money and goods.
6. ANONIMITY AND DECENTRALIZED FINANCE
Anonymity is another factor that can both raise and lower certain transaction costs
of exchange, particularly in financial applications. On the one hand, just as the
development of new financial instruments in the second half of the 20th century
helped investors to avoid certain regulatory and tax costs, anonymity and lack of a
third party facilitator that can be easily regulated by the state can help borrowers
and lenders avoid similar costs. While this is often portrayed by opponents as a
facilitator of nefarious activity, transactors in underdeveloped countries that suffer
from unstable regimes of governance stand to benefit. Financial activity under these
regimes are at high risk of suffering costs from outside intervention in the form of
wealth confiscation, burdensome taxes, and restrictions on the form of allowable
lending. Under such regimes, and especially with weak rule of law, the reduction of
these transaction costs matters relatively more on the margin than in developed
financial systems.
For this reason, entrepreneurs in underdeveloped and developing economies
have greater incentive to integrate cryptocurrency and decentralized finance into
their business activities. Not coincidentally, there has been an explosion of
cryptocurrency adoption and development in African countries. As with the earlier
adoption of mobile money – for example M-PESA in Kenya, that has greatly reduced
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the transaction costs for African vendors (Burns 2018) – exchanges supporting
cryptocurrency transfers are appearing across Africa. In particular, BitPesa
combines the attractive feature of money transfers supported by M-PESA with
Bitcoin (Burns Forthcoming). Users can transfer their locally denominated funds in
the form of Bitcoin. While no medium is perfectly safe, the costs of confiscating
wealth in the form of cryptocurrency are much higher for state actors, thereby
providing greater security for vendors who might otherwise be extorted by state
actors.
The adoption of cryptocurrency in the developing world highlights the
significance of institutional context for the transaction cost narrative. While a
technological innovation might uniformly reduce direct transactions costs such as
transportation or storage costs, the legal institutions governing exchange vary
widely between regions, especially in the developing world, and these can impose a
variety of artifactual transaction costs. While the computing and internet
revolutions occurred largely in the developed world, lower-fixed-cost wireless
communication technologies have enabled the latest technological wave to
profoundly impact areas that are relatively impoverished and lack stable governance
institutions. Thus, the transaction cost story demands concern not simply for
technical features of the transactions in question, but also – importantly – for local
circumstances and heterogeneities that similarly attracted attention with regard to
the spread and adoption of new technologies (Romer 1993; 1994). Cryptocurrency
and decentralized finance may help these less developed countries leap frog past the
financial status quo.
Whatever the potential of this new financial technology, developers are in the
process of overcoming challenges that generally inhibit lending. By contrast to
payments, anonymity heavily raises transaction costs in the domain of decentralized
finance, to the point where the market may indeed unravel entirely. We begin with
the basic question: how can funds be intermediated between anonymous borrowers
and lenders without the market unravelling?
Consider first the contrast to spot exchange of goods for cryptocurrency. If a user
provides cryptocurrency to a vendor for some good, there is little reason to be
concerned about the buyer’s identity. Buyers, on the other hand, will likely prefer to
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transact with a respectable vendor, so there is little reason to worry about poor
behavior on the seller’s part. The one-time transaction is self-enforcing, meaning
that the vendor is incentivized to provide the good as identified in the exchange
contract and the buyer need only to provide funds to receive the good.
By contrast, consider real-world financial transactions without cryptocurrency.
In our discussion of the early development of finance, we noted that the lender takes
a significant risk in placing trusted resources by the hands of the borrowers. Lenders
attempt to offset losses from default and reduce the likelihood of default. If the
lender only offsets losses from default by charging a risk premium, the level of
lending will be severely constrained, and vulnerable to adverse selection problems.
A better solution is for the lender to invest resources to gather relevant
information about the borrower ex ante that reduces the ex-post cost of enforcement
of contract terms (Harwick and Caton 2020). If the lender has reason to think that
the borrower is likely to default, he might simply deny a loan to the borrower in
order to avoid this cost and limit the premium that he charges to borrowers that he
perceives as reliable. The lender can make such an evaluation by judging whether or
not the borrower is affiliated with a commercial network. In the modern era, and
especially with larger firms, this appears in the form of a credit check, among other
means. In the past, and especially with smaller firms such as credit unions, more ad
hoc reputational systems have been employed, such as local information or
relationship-building. These systems integrate the borrower into a long-run, or
infinitely repeated, game and reduces the transactions costs of enforcement and
information-gathering (Talbot, et al. 2015, 116).
In both cases, lenders rely on institutional solutions to incentivize repayment. A
borrower risks his credit score or his local reputation, in addition to any collateral
offered, to secure a given loan. The entrepreneur and his business operate within a
nexus of a community and its formal and informal institutions. In both cases,
incentive compatibility depends on the impact of default or repayment upon the
ability of the entrepreneur to bring current plans to fulfillment in the future.
Availability of a borrower’s identifying information to a lender lowers the risks and
therefore the marginal cost of lending, thereby increasing the total amount of
lending.
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The lack of connection to real-world identity hobbles decentralized finance at
exactly this point. The cost of accessing information about a pseudonymous
borrower is prohibitively high. Even if information is available about financial
activity conducted by a pseudonymous actor, if identity is alienable – that is, if
nothing prevents the borrower from exiting the network and rejoining with a clean
slate – the lender has no recourse against opportunistic borrowers. The risk of
default is sufficient to prevent uncollateralized lending altogether. And even with
collateral, the level of collateral required to make repayment incentive compatible is
often greater than the value of the loan itself (Harwick and Caton 2020). Alienable
identity reduces interaction to finite play with prohibitive transaction costs of
enforcement.
Oracles present a solution to this dilemma. An oracle is a protocol that can
securely provide external information to a blockchain. For the purpose of
decentralized finance, this information may relay the creditworthiness of the
borrower to the lender without simultaneously revealing the identity of that
borrower so long as the loan is repaid, if the oracle is backed by a mutually trusted
party. Information can be drawn from the traditional financial sector. This contingent
anonymity allows decentralized financial applications to lower transaction costs by
providing only the information that is required to indicate the soundness of a given
loan. Whereas information and enforcement costs are essentially infinite by
definition in the case of perfect anonymity and are prohibitively in the case of
pseudonymity, these costs are greatly reduced in the case of default since the oracle
will automatically reveal identifying information to the lender. Thus, the borrower
cannot simply start anew if he or she absconds with borrowed funds. Play moves
from a finitely repeated game to an infinitely repeated game since, with identity as
collateral, the stake expands from the borrower-lender relationship to any future
interaction with members of and institutions comprising the financial system by the
borrower.
The result is that decentralized finance applications can simultaneously reduce
costs for borrowers who would like to maintain a private identity and centralization
of control over their funds will also reducing enforcement costs for lenders. As with
the development of mobile money and cryptocurrency applications in African
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countries, borrowers who otherwise would face much risk owing to institutional
uncertainty face a better chance of receiving a loan and ensuring that such wealth is
not vulnerable to confiscation by either public or private actors.
7. THE FUTURE: FALLING TRANSACTION COSTS, MONETARY STABILITY, AND
FINANCIAL EXCLUSION
Coase (1937) argued that firms exist because they reduce the cost of accessing
resources as compared to accessing them in the marketplace. Innovations, he notes,
may further reduce the cost of organizing resources within a firm. Coase (1960)
followed up on this intuition, showing that positive transaction costs negatively
impact economic efficiency. In particular, clear definition and efficient enforcement
of property rights decrease transaction costs and improve the ability of
entrepreneurs to form accurate expectations of future states of the world.
Blockchain technology in general, and cryptocurrency and decentralized finance in
particular, as institutional technologies (Davidson et al. 2018; Berg et al., 2019),
stand to improve economic performance on both of these margins.
As new institutional technologies reduce marginal transaction costs, investments
that were once strictly unprofitable become profitable, resulting in something like
stages of economic evolution. But the developments of cryptocurrency, blockchain
technology, and decentralized finance are unique in how they affect transaction
costs. The effects of previous innovations have tended to be limited by the ability to
accumulate and integrate new technology into a local economy governed by an
existing institutional framework. Cryptocurrency and decentralized finance are
emerging in a world where modern communication technologies that they require
have been adopted across much of the developing world.
Even within the narrower confines of financial applications, blockchain
technology can transform existing institutions and provide substitutes for existing
institutions. There is growing interest for cryptocurrency to serve as commonly
accepted media of exchange in developing countries. For example, in 2021 the
President of El Salvador has signed into law a bill that makes Bitcoin legal tender in
the country (Terzo 2021). Use and ownership of cryptocurrency in many developing
countries is on the rise (Buchholz 2021). Whether due to direct adoption or the
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existence of competing currencies, these developments bode well for countries that
have suffered from monetary mismanagement.
It is exactly these most impoverished areas that stand to gain most from the
integration of blockchain and cryptocurrency with existing financial systems. The
1980s and 1990s were a failure for national income convergence, a failure that
brought into focus concern on discrepancies in institutions, productive technology,
and human capital between nations. For a variety of reasons, the usual prescription
of opening up a country to foreign investment, and thus to the importation of
technology and human capital, was not always a politically feasible strategy. In
particular, dysfunctional institutions that failed to protect property rights of
investors discouraged this sort of investment, and there is no formulaic path to
improving dysfunctional institutions (Acemoglu 2003).
The security provided by blockchain technology does not depend on the quality
of local institutions, provided there exists sufficient technological infrastructure to
support a the network. Whether or not other countries adopt Bitcoin as legal tender
as did El Salvador has no bearing on the quantity of Bitcoin produced, nor would this
substantively impact the operation of the consensus algorithm. And while local
governing institutions might affect operations of a business that has taken out a loan
in the form of cryptocurrency, corrupt governments are not likely to be able to
confiscate cryptocurrency lent with support of protocol. While countries like Kenya
and Ethiopia have experienced sustained growth for more than a decade now, it is
not difficult to imagine that investment opportunities provided by decentralized
finance will be wind in the sails of these countries as well as countries whose
economies struggled to develop during the 20th century. According to the Statista
report cited above (n8), over 30% of Nigerians have owned Bitcoin and as have over
20% of residents of Vietnam and the Philippines. While the extent of the cryptorevolution is not especially obvious in the developed world, many in developing
countries have been the beneficiaries of falling transaction costs. The benefits of
blockchain and cryptocurrency are no mystery to these groups.
Cryptocurrency and cryptofinance have the potential to usher in a period of
international financial integration that could only be dreamed of a half-century ago.
This new technology is the latest iteration of cost reducing technologies and is

Published by Journal of New Finance - UFM Madrid, 2021

19

Journal of New Finance, Vol. 2 [2021], No. 4, Art. 3

poised to have the most significant impact in areas that have traditionally suffered
from financial exclusion. Much remains to be said concerning the impact of
blockchain more generally on economic development and organization in the form
of supply chain integration and the changing nature of the firm; however, this is
beyond the focus of the present article. We are seeing the first hints of the impact
that cryptocurrency and decentralized finance will have on economic organization.
As with these first hints, the transaction costs framework illuminates the
significance of this development.
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